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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, Matthew Cudney was terminated from his employment 
with ALSCO, Inc. a few weeks after reporting to his supervisor and hu-
man resources manager that he observed the branch general manager 
appearing intoxicated at work and driving away in a company vehicle.1 
Cudney brought an action for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy, claiming that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting the 
manager’s drinking and driving.2 Cudney asserted that the Washington 
Industrial Safety and Health Act (WISHA) establishes a public policy 
protecting workers who report safety violations.3 He also asserted that 
Washington’s DUI laws4 clearly indicate a public policy protecting the 
public from drunk drivers.5 In a 5–4 decision, the Washington Supreme 
Court held that the statutory remedies available under WISHA are ade-
quate to protect the underlying public policy.6 The court also held that 
Washington’s criminal DUI laws are not an inadequate means of promot-
ing the public policy, and that the public policy—rather than Cudney’s 
own interests—must be promoted.7 Based on these two conclusions, the 
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 1. Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244, 245 (Wash. 2011). 
 2. Id. at 245–46. 
 3. Id. at 246. 
 4. The term “DUI laws” refers to Washington’s laws criminalizing driving while under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.61.502 (2012), 46.61.5055 (2012). 
 5. Cudney, 259 P.3d at 246. 
 6. Id. at 250. 
 7. Id. 
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court held that Cudney’s tort claim of wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy could not proceed.8 
This Note contends that the Cudney court erred in determining that 
WISHA adequately promotes the public policy of insuring workplace 
safety; in deciding that public safety is adequately promoted by Wash-
ington’s DUI laws; and in finding that the common law exception of 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy does not apply in this 
case. The court’s conclusion that WISHA was an adequate remedy was 
erroneous because of the unreasonably short time period available to file 
a claim under the statute, the lack of a robust administrative scheme, and 
the lack of full remedies available to a discharged employee. Further-
more, the court’s determination that DUI laws adequately promote public 
policy, regardless of whether a remedy is available to the terminated em-
ployee, leaves an employee with no recourse for a wrongful termination 
and may discourage employees from reporting criminal activity. 
This Note proceeds in seven parts. Part II discusses the history of 
employment at-will in Washington as well as the development of the 
public policy exception. This section also addresses the four-factor test 
adopted by the court to analyze a wrongful discharge claim. Part III in-
troduces the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act, including the 
public policy served by the Act, as well as the protections provided for 
workers. In addition, this Part highlights cases in which the court found 
the public policy exception applicable for claims premised on workplace 
protection laws. This Part also discusses the split in other jurisdictions 
regarding the adequacy of statutory remedies. Part IV introduces Wash-
ington’s DUI laws and discusses what remedies are available under the 
criminal statutes. Part V analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Cudney and discusses the final resolution of the case. Part VI discusses 
possible future implications of the Cudney decision and proposes reme-
dial legislation that the Washington State Legislature should adopt. Part 
VII concludes that the Washington Supreme Court incorrectly foreclosed 
a common law cause of action in the Cudney case, and that action by the 
court or the legislature is necessary to properly balance the interests of 
employers, employees, and society. 
II. WASHINGTON EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL AND THE PUBLIC POLICY 
EXCEPTION 
This Part discusses the development of Washington’s employment 
at-will doctrine, including the public policy exception, and sets out the 
                                                            
 8. Id. at 251. 
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four-part test that a court will use in analyzing a tort claim of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy. 
A. Doctrine of Employment At-Will 
Under the doctrine of employment at-will, either the employer or 
employee may terminate an employment contract of indefinite period at-
will without incurring liability.9 Washington has recognized the doctrine 
since as early as 1928;10 the doctrine’s roots stem from a treatise written 
by Horace Gray Wood in 1877.11 Although employment at-will remains 
the default rule, an employer’s ability to terminate an employee has been 
constrained by both state and federal law. For example, statutes prohibit 
an employer from discharging an employee based on race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.12 Further, statutes prohibit employers from 
discharging an employee who has filed a complaint with the government 
regarding workplace safety13 or minimum wage violations.14 Some stat-
utes require that certain public employees are terminated only for 
cause.15 In addition to statutory constraints, the doctrine of employment 
at-will may be limited by contract between the parties; moreover, collec-
tive bargaining agreements may prohibit an employer from terminating 
an employee except for cause.16 
                                                            
 9. Davidson v. Mackall-Paine Veneer Co., 271 P. 878 (Wash. 1928). The employment at-will 
rule allows an employer to dismiss an at-will employee “for any reason or no reason.” HENRY H. 
PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE, § 1.01 (5th ed. Supp. 2009). 
 10. Davidson, 271 P. 878. 
 11. HORACE GRAY WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877). Prior 
to the development of the at-will doctrine, employment was viewed in light of the master–servant 
relationship, in which a general hiring, without a specified time limit, was construed as a contract for 
one year. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE, § 1.03 (5th ed. 2006). 
Following large-scale organization and production brought by the Industrial Revolution, both em-
ployers and employees sought more flexibility in negotiating employment terms. Id. at § 1.04. 
Wood’s 1877 treatise repudiated the one-year contract rule and articulated the rule that “a general or 
indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will.” Id. The at-will rule quickly spread and was adopted 
by the majority of jurisdictions by as early as 1913. Id.; see also Jay M. Feinman, The Development 
of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976). 
 12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2; Washington Law Against Discrimination, 
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (2009) (mirroring the federal protections with the addition of protec-
tion for honorably discharged veterans and those with a sensory, mental, or physical handicap). 
 13. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160 (2010). 
 14. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.46.100 (2010). 
 15. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.400.300 (2012) (limiting discharge of school employ-
ees to “sufficient cause”), WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.08.090 (2007), 41.14.120 (2012), 41.12.090 
(2007), 43.43.070 (1984) (requiring cause to discharge firefighters, sheriffs, city police, and Wash-
ington State Patrol officers). 
 16. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 3. See, e.g., Comfort & Fleming Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. 
Hoxsey, 613 P.2d 138, 141 (Wash. 1980) (a contract provision requiring “[t]ermination for good 
cause shown is a restriction on the employer’s right to discharge an employee at will”); Peninsula 
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B. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy 
One judicial constraint on the doctrine of employment at-will is the 
common law tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The 
court will not allow the at-will doctrine to shield an employer’s action 
“which otherwise frustrates a clear manifestation of public policy.”17 The 
majority of states have also recognized the public policy exception as a 
cause of action.18 
The Washington Supreme Court first recognized the public policy 
exception in Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.19 The Thompson court 
held that the “narrow public policy exception should be adopted because 
it properly balances the interest of both the employer and employee.”20 
The court recognized that a “growing majority” of jurisdictions had 
adopted a public policy exception to the doctrine of employment at-
will.21 In a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, 
the employee has the burden to show that the discharge contravened a 
clear mandate of public policy.22 
Since Thompson, the Washington Supreme Court has continued to 
hold that the public policy exception should be construed narrowly.23 The 
court has identified four general areas that discharge may be in violation 
of a clear public policy: (1) where the employee was discharged for re-
                                                                                                                                     
Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Pub. Sch. Employees of Peninsula, 924 P.2d 13, 15 (Wash. 1996) (“Job securi-
ty provisions, including a just cause limit on terminations, come within the ambit of ‘working condi-
tions’ and constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining.”). 
 17. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wash. 1984). The public policy 
tort “require[s] courts to balance employee, employer, and societal interests.” HENRY H. PERRITT 
JR., WORKPLACE TORTS: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES § 3.1 (1991). The employer has an economic 
interest in freely running its business, while the employee has an economic interest in maintaining 
employment. Id. The public policy tort recognizes that society’s interests can tip the scales in either 
direction. Id. Society’s interest in freedom of contract, expressed in the at-will rule, will add weight 
to the employer’s side of the scale. Id. But if the discharge contravenes public policy, society’s inter-
est in protecting that policy may tip the scales back to the employee’s side. Id. 
 18. Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that Employer May Discharge 
At-Will Employee for Any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4th 544 (1982) (listing thirty-four states that have rec-
ognized, or stated their willingness to recognize, the cause of action). 
 19. Thompson, 685 P.2d 1081. 
 20. Id. at 1089. 
 21. Id. at 1088. The court noted fifteen jurisdictions that had explicitly adopted the exception 
and an additional two courts that had implied in dicta that they may. Id. at 1088 n. 1. 
 22. Id. at 1089. 
 23. See, e.g., Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244, 246 (Wash. 2011) (“From this court’s 
first recognition of the tort of wrongful discharge in Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., we empha-
sized that ‘courts should proceed cautiously.’”) (quoting Thompson, 685 P.2d at 1089); Sedlacek v. 
Hillis, 36 P.3d 1014, 1017 (Wash. 2001) (“we have recognized that the tort of wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy is a narrow exception to the employment at-will doctrine in Washington 
State”); Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 380 (Wash. 1996) (“the exception should 
be narrowly construed in order to guard against frivolous lawsuits”). 
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fusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where the employee was discharged 
due to performing a public duty or obligation; (3) where the employee 
was discharged for exercising a legal right; and (4) where the employee 
was discharged due to “whistleblowing” activity.24 
1. The Four-Element Framework 
The court in Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc. adopted a four-part 
test for analyzing wrongful discharge claims involving violations of pub-
lic policy.25 First, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a clear public 
policy: the clarity element. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the pub-
lic policy would be jeopardized if the conduct the employee engaged in 
was discouraged: the jeopardy element. Third, the plaintiff must prove 
that the conduct related to public policy caused the discharge: the causa-
tion element. Finally, the defendant must not be able to justify the dis-
charge on other grounds: the absence of justification element.26 
In Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc.—the focus of this Note—the parties 
stipulated that WISHA and Washington’s DUI laws established clear 
public policies and therefore the clarity element was not under considera-
tion.27 The causation and absence of justification elements are typically 
questions of fact, which are not usually decided on summary judgment, 
and the court was not asked to consider these elements.28 The only ele-
ment that the Cudney court was asked to decide was the jeopardy ele-
ment.29 
The court has recognized that the jeopardy element “strictly limits 
the scope of claims under the tort of wrongful discharge.”30 In order to 
                                                            
 24. Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1006–07 (Wash. 1989) (providing case examples of each 
general area). “Along with a growing number of jurisdictions, we recognize the public policy found 
in protecting employees who are discharged in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., 
employee ‘whistleblowing’ activity.” Id. at 1007. Generally, the term “whistleblower” refers to an 
“employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement agency.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). The term may also include an employee who makes a 
complaint to “his or her superior within his employer’s organization.” DANIEL P. WESTMAN & 
NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 22 (2d ed. 
2004). “‘Whistleblowing’ occurs when an employee reports illegal or improper conduct to superiors 
or to outside authorities and is discharged in retaliation for doing so. It falls within the ‘public poli-
cy’ exception to the at-will doctrine because, although no law compels an individual to step forward 
and communicate his suspicions regarding criminal activity, public policy clearly favors the expo-
sure of crime.” Wrongful Discharge, supra note 16, at § 117. 
 25. 913 P.2d 377. 
 26. Id. at 382 (adopting the test advocated in PERRITT, supra note 17, at § 3.7). 
 27. Cudney, 259 P.3d at 245–46. 
 28. Id. at 247 n.1. 
 29. Id. at 246. 
 30. Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 139 (Wash. 2008). 
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successfully prove the jeopardy element, the plaintiff must show that his 
or her conduct directly relates to public policy, that other means of pro-
moting public policy are inadequate, and that the actions the plaintiff 
took were the “only available adequate means” to promote public poli-
cy.31 
When the statutory source of a clear public policy also includes 
administrative remedies, the jeopardy element is far more difficult for the 
plaintiff to establish.32 However, in his treatise, Professor Perritt argues 
that the administrative remedies can only shield employee conduct, 
thereby precluding public policy tort claims, if the remedies “are availa-
ble to the particular type of plaintiff involved.”33 
III. WASHINGTON INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 
This Part discusses the history, purpose, and enforcement of the 
Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act. It also discusses cases 
where a plaintiff has brought a claim of wrongful discharge in violation 
of public policy premised on WISHA or other workplace safety laws. 
A. History and Purpose of the WISHA Statute 
The Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 197334 was en-
acted following extensive federal legislation in 1970, which resulted in 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).35 Under OSHA, a state 
may choose to maintain its own industrial safety plan, with approval 
from the Secretary of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
                                                            
 31. Id. 
 32. PERRITT, supra note 17, at § 3.15. 
 33. Id. 
 34. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17 (2013). 
 35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–677 (1970). On January 23, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a 
message to Congress proposing a “comprehensive Occupational Health and Safety Program, to 
protect the worker while he is on the job.” President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the 
Congress, To Earn a Living: The Right of Every American, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT 
(Jan. 23, 1968) http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?[id=28849. The President indicated that ade-
quate protection did not exist to safeguard workers from hazards on the job and proposed federal 
protection for all workers engaged in interstate commerce and federal support for the states to pro-
tect workers engaged in intra-state commerce. Id. at 8. Between 1968 and 1970, both the House and 
Senate conducted hearings on the proposed Act before finally adopting the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970 on December 29, 1970. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91–596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–677). OSHA sets out duties of employ-
ers and employees, 29 U.S.C. § 654, and delegates responsibility to the Secretary of Labor to prom-
ulgate safety and health standards. 29 U.S.C. § 655. 
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if certain conditions are met.36 WISHA is Washington’s approved indus-
trial safety plan and preempts the applicable federal law. 
WISHA establishes that an employer has a duty to comply with 
promulgated regulations and to furnish employees with a place of em-
ployment free from recognized hazards that are causing, or are likely to 
cause, serious injury or death to employees.37 The purpose of WISHA is 
to ensure safe and healthy working conditions for every man and woman 
working in the state of Washington.38 
In addition to the general employer duties, WISHA adopted the 
language of OSHA’s anti-discrimination statute.39 WISHA prohibits em-
ployers from discharging or discriminating against any employee who 
has filed a safety complaint, has testified or is planning to testify in any 
WISHA proceeding, or has exercised any right afforded under WISHA.40 
If an employee believes that his discharge violates these protections, he 
may file a complaint with the director of the Department of Labor and 
Industries within thirty days of his termination.41 Following receipt of a 
complaint, the director must investigate the situation, and if the director 
determines that WISHA has been violated, he or she must bring a cause 
of action against the employer.42 If the director determines that the em-
ployer did not violate the statute, the employee may still bring a cause of 
action on his own behalf within thirty days of the director’s determina-
tion.43 In such an action, the court may order all appropriate relief includ-
ing rehiring or reinstating the employee to his or her former position with 
back pay.44 
B. Enforcement of WISHA 
The legislature delegated the administration and enforcement of 
WISHA to the Department of Labor and Industries (the Department).45 In 
order to ensure the enforcement of the WISHA anti-discrimination stat-
ute, the Department promulgated regulations setting out the administra-
tive procedure the Department uses upon receipt of a WISHA com-
                                                            
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 667; see also Alan S. Paja, The Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act: 
WISHA’s Twentieth Anniversary, 1973–1993, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 259, 264 (1994). 
 37. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.060(1) (2010). 
 38. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.010 (1973). 
 39. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160 (2010). 
 40. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160 (2010). 
 41. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160(2) (2010). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.020 (2010). 
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plaint.46 The Department procedures contain slight changes from the 
statutory language that weaken the administrative remedies. For exam-
ple, while the WISHA statute states that the director must file a cause of 
action upon finding a violation, the regulation states that the Department 
“may bring a civil action against the violator.”47 The regulations also del-
egate responsibility to the assistant director (rather than the director) for 
investigation and determination of complaints.48 If the assistant director 
determines that a violation has not occurred, the employee may file a 
written request for review by the director within fifteen days of receipt of 
the determination.49 
The regulations also provide further detail regarding the timing of 
complaints. WISHA provides for a thirty-day window for an employee to 
file a complaint.50 The Department will presume that complaints that are 
not filed within the thirty-day window are untimely and will decline to 
accept them.51 There may be some circumstances, however, where the 
Department will toll the thirty-day period, such as instances where the 
employer has concealed or misled the employee regarding the grounds 
for discharge.52 
C. Wrongful Discharge Claims Under Workplace Safety Laws in 
Washington 
In Washington, case law involving wrongful discharge premised on 
workplace safety laws has developed from early cases, in which a claim 
was found to be barred by statute, to later cases allowing a claim to move 
forward regardless of statutory remedies. In Jones v. Industrial Electric-
Seattle, Inc., the Court of Appeals, Division II, held that WISHA “both 
states a policy and affords a remedy.”53 The court pointed to language in 
the statute authorizing the court to order “all appropriate relief,” and stat-
                                                            
 46. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 296–360–010 (2013). 
 47. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 296–360–020 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 48. Id. 
 49. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 296–360–040(2) (2013). 
 50. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160(2) (2010). 
 51. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 296–360–030(4) (2013). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Jones v. Indus. Elec.-Seattle, Inc., 768 P.2d 520, 522 (Wash. 1989) overruled by State v. 
WWJ Corp., 980 P.2d 1257 (Wash. 1999); see also Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 
821 P.2d 18 (Wash. 1991) (disapproving of Jones). Jones was discharged after making several com-
plaints about unsafe working conditions. Jones filed a timely complaint with the Department of 
Labor and Industries and was notified that the Department would take no action following its inves-
tigation. Jones brought suit two years later, and summary judgment was granted to the defendant 
because Jones did not bring the action within thirty days of the department’s determination, as re-
quired by statute. 
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ed that this language indicates a comprehensive remedy with no room for 
judicial legislation.54 Because the plaintiff did not bring his claim within 
the statutory period, he was unable to move forward with his tort claim 
of wrongful discharge.55 
The Jones decision was distinguished by the Washington Supreme 
Court in Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.56 The statute at 
issue in Wilmot was a Washington industrial insurance statute with a 
statutory remedy very similar to the WISHA statute.57 The court held that 
the statute was not mandatory and exclusive and that therefore an em-
ployee “may file a tort claim for wrongful discharge . . . independent of 
the statute.”58 One reason the court gave for this decision centered on the 
language of the statute. Like the language in WISHA, the statute at issue 
in Wilmot contained language stating that an employee who believes he 
has been discriminated against may file a complaint with the director, 
and upon receipt the director shall conduct an investigation.59 The court 
stated that the use of the word “may” in the same provision as “shall” is 
“strong evidence that the Legislature did not intend [the statute] to pro-
vide the exclusive procedure and remedies to redress retaliatory dis-
charges resulting from exercise of a worker’s rights.”60 The court also 
noted that the statute contained no language, express or implied, that 
would indicate the statute was intended to be the exclusive remedy.61 
Also similar to WISHA, the insurance statute contained a provision al-
lowing an employee to file an action in court if the director finds no vio-
lation. This further strengthened the court’s view that the statute was not 
the exclusive remedy.62 The court also questioned whether the statutory 
                                                            
 54. Jones, 768 P.2d at 539. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Wilmot, 821 P.2d 18. Plaintiffs in Wilmot were twenty-two former employees who were 
injured on the job and either missed work due to the injury or continued to work with an injury due 
to company policy stating an employee who misses work will be terminated. Each plaintiff filed a 
claim for worker’s compensation benefits and all claimed they were discharged because of their 
workers’ compensation claims. None of the plaintiffs filed a claim with the Department of Labor and 
Industries, as required by the statute. The employer moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute 
provided an exclusive remedy, but the Washington Supreme Court held that the remedy was not 
exclusive and allowed the tort claims to move forward. Id. 
 57. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.48.025 (1985). The statute prohibits an employer from discharging 
or discriminating against any employee because the employee has filed or communicated to the 
employer an intention to file a claim for compensation. Id. The only significant difference between 
the two statutes is that the industrial insurance statute provides a window of ninety days for the em-
ployee to file a claim, rather than the thirty days provided by WISHA. 
 58. Wilmot, 821 P.2d at 21. 
 59. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.48.025(2) (1985) (emphasis added). 
 60. Wilmot, 821 P.2d at 22. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 23. 
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remedy would provide the employee with the ability to recover all of the 
same damages that he would be entitled to in a tort action, such as emo-
tional distress damages.63 
Following Wilmot, the Court of Appeals, Division I, in Wilson v. 
City of Monroe considered whether WISHA was intended to provide the 
exclusive and mandatory remedy.64 Noting the similarities between 
WISHA and the industrial insurance statute under consideration in Wil-
mot, the Wilson court followed the analysis in Wilmot and determined 
that WISHA was not the exclusive remedy for claims under the statute. 
Therefore, the plaintiff was allowed to bring a cause of action for wrong-
ful discharge.65 While Jones and Wilmot were both decided prior to the 
Washington Supreme Court’s adoption of the four-part test in Gardner, 
the Wilson case was decided after Gardner. 
Several years after Wilson, the Washington Supreme Court allowed 
a wrongful discharge claim to move forward under WISHA in Ellis v. 
City of Seattle.66 The primary question presented for the court’s determi-
nation was whether the plaintiff must prove an actual violation of 
WISHA or whether the plaintiff’s objectively reasonable belief that the 
policy has been violated would suffice.67 The court held that, in the con-
text of public health and safety, the jeopardy element may be established 
by the plaintiff’s “objectively reasonable belief the law may be violated 
in the absence of his or her action.”68 The court held that “to establish his 
retaliation claim under RCW 49.17.160(1) . . . [a]ll he has to do is prove 
                                                            
 63. Id. at 25. 
 64. Wilson v. City of Monroe, 943 P.2d 1134 (Wash. 1997). Wilson was employed by the City 
of Monroe as a waste water treatment facility plant manager. Wilson filed complaints regarding 
illegal discharges into the Skykomish River with the Washington State Department of Ecology and 
the Environmental Protection Agency. The city terminated Wilson for poor performance, and he was 
notified of his right to pursue a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement. Wilson filed a 
complaint with the city and his union representative filed a grievance on his behalf, but Wilson dis-
missed his administrative law claims and instead chose to pursue remedies in superior court. The 
court reversed summary judgment for the employer, holding that Wilson’s failure to exhaust reme-
dies under his agreement did not preclude a wrongful discharge tort action and that WISHA did not 
provide a mandatory and exclusive remedy. 
 65. Id. at 1140. 
 66. Ellis v. City of Seattle, 13 P.3d 1065 (Wash. 2000). Ellis was employed as a sound techni-
cian at the Seattle Center. Ellis raised complaints to his superior about an order to bypass a fire alarm 
system and after he insisted on obtaining proper authorization before bypassing the fire alarm relay, 
Ellis was suspended by the human resources manager. Ellis then made a complaint to the Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries about being asked to disable part of the fire alarm system, and shortly 
thereafter Ellis was discharged for gross insubordination. The Washington Supreme Court reversed 
summary judgment for the employer, holding that Ellis either met all four elements or that factual 
questions on the jeopardy and absence of justification elements should preclude summary judgment. 
 67. Id. at 1070. 
 68. Id. at 1071. 
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the City terminated him for making a WISHA complaint”69 and allowed 
the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge to move forward. 
Another case involving safety and protection of workers who report 
safety violations, although not based on WISHA, is Korslund v. Dyn-
Corp Tri-Cities Services, Inc.70 In Korslund, the Washington Supreme 
Court held that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the jeopardy element be-
cause the statute upon which the plaintiffs relied provided adequate 
means for promoting public policy.71 The plaintiffs asserted that a clear 
public policy was established by the federal Energy Reorganization Act 
(ERA), which prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating 
against an employee who notified his employer of a violation of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.72 The court recognized a clear public policy 
of encouraging and protecting employees who report violations without 
fear of retaliation.73 However, the court identified the comprehensive 
administrative remedies contained within the statute as protecting the 
public policy.74 The court distinguished the Wilmot case, stating that in 
Korslund, the question was “whether other means of protecting the pub-
lic policy are adequate so that recognition of a tort claim in these circum-
stances is unnecessary to protect the public policy.”75 The court held that 
the remedies under the ERA were adequate to protect public policy, and 
therefore, the plaintiff’s claims for wrongful discharge failed as a matter 
of law.76 
D. Wrongful Discharge Under Federal and State Workplace Pro-
tection Laws Outside of Washington 
Jurisdictions outside of Washington are split over whether OSHA 
or comparable state laws adequately protect public policy to preclude a 
common law tort claim.77 After considering this question, courts in some 
states have determined that the remedial procedures that OSHA provides 
                                                            
 69. Id. 
 70. Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Services, Inc., 125 P.3d 119 (Wash. 2005). 
 71. Id. at 126. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 127. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See George v. D.W. Zinser Co., 762 N.W.2d 865, 872 (Iowa 2009) (“Although state courts 
and circuit courts are split on the issue of whether OSHA and the state equivalents preclude common 
law claims for wrongful discharge, the majority recognize the statutory remedies are not exclu-
sive.”). See generally Monique C. Lillard, Exploring Paths to Recovery for OSHA Whistleblowers: 
Section 11(c) of the OSHAct and the Public Policy Tort, 6 EMPL. RTS. & EMPL. POL’Y J. 329 (2002); 
Occ. Safety & Health L. § 20:1 (2011 ed.); 75 A.L.R.4th 13 § 3 (Originally published in 1989). 
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are inadequate to protect the public policy of workplace safety. The rea-
sons given for allowing a common law claim to move forward are, gen-
erally, that OSHA does not explicitly preclude a state common law tort 
claim; that the OSHA filing procedures are too limited to adequately pro-
tect public policy; that terminating an employee who has reported a safe-
ty complaint is an affront to safety concerns; and that the potential to de-
ter other employees from reporting issues is too great to justify preclud-
ing a claim.78 
In states that have determined that OSHA provides an adequate 
statutory remedy, courts have stated that the plaintiff’s common law 
claim is precluded. Those courts generally indicate that the common law 
claim must fail because the statute specifies the civil remedy available to 
an employee who is alleging wrongful termination.79 
Federal courts are also split over whether OSHA provides adequate 
remedies.80 The public policy exception is a state common law tort and is 
not based on federal law, so any federal court analyzing the adequacy of 
statutory remedies will be evaluating the state common law and will thus 
split along the same state lines discussed above. 
IV. WASHINGTON’S DUI LAWS 
This Part discusses Washington’s statutes criminalizing driving 
while under the influence of alcohol and the penalties and remedies 
available under the statutes. 
                                                            
 78. See, e.g., Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 168 (Ct. App. 1982) (“We do not find . 
. . an intent on the part of the Legislature to preclude an employee from suing on his own behalf.”); 
Flenker v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 967 P.2d 295 (Kan. 1998) (finding an “employee’s remedy for 
wrongful discharge in retaliation for filing complaint under OSHA . . . is inadequate”); Cerracchio v. 
Alden Leeds, Inc., 538 A.2d 1292, 1298–99 (N.J. App. Div. 1988) (“retaliation against the reporting 
employee as a punitive measure and as a deterrent to other observers of unsafe conditions, directly 
affronts our policy in favor of safety”); Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 308, 323–24 
(Ohio 1997) (“such retaliatory practices could deter employees from reporting what they believe to 
be legitimate health and safety concerns. . . .”). 
 79. See, e.g., Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 745 A.2d 178, 184 (Conn. 2000) (“because the 
plaintiff had a remedy under 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) for the retaliatory discharge she had alleged, she 
was not ‘otherwise without [a] remedy’ and her common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge 
is precluded”); Benningfield v. Pettit Envtl., Inc., 183 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005) (“the 
statute provides both the unlawful act and specifies the civil remedy available to aggrieved parties”); 
Franklin v. Clarke, CIV. 1O–00382–CL, 2011 WL 4024638 (D. Or. Sept. 9, 2011) (“Because Plain-
tiff has an adequate remedy in his state statutory whistle-blower claims, his wrongful discharge 
claim is precluded.”). 
 80. Compare Miles v. Martin Marietta Corp., 861 F. Supp. 73, 74 (D. Colo. 1994) (“Colorado 
law is clear that a separate public policy wrongful discharge claim is not available where the statute 
at issue provides a wrongful discharge remedy.”), with Kohrt v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 364 F.3d 
894, 901–02 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that Iowa common law allows a wrongful discharge claim 
under OSHA remedial schemes). 
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In Washington, it is illegal for a person to drive or physically con-
trol a vehicle if the person has a blood alcohol content of 0.08 or higher 
or is under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or drug.81 A violation 
of the statute is generally a gross misdemeanor.82 Penalties for violators 
include mandatory imprisonment and a mandatory fine.83 Any person 
convicted of violating the statute may also be required to apply for an 
ignition interlock device, which prevents the vehicle from starting when 
the driver’s breath sample has an alcohol concentration of 0.025 or high-
er.84 
In spite of the existing criminal penalties for driving while under 
the influence, drunk driving remains a problem. The Washington Traffic 
Safety Commission (WTSC) ranks impaired driving prevention as a top 
priority because impaired driving is a leading factor in traffic fatalities.85 
The WTSC reports that between 2004 and 2008, there were 1,221 fatal 
crashes involving impaired driving, resulting in a total of 1,363 fatali-
ties.86 In 2009 alone, Washington reported 492 total traffic fatalities, 42% 
of which involved a driver with blood alcohol content above 0.08.87 
The WTSC uses several mechanisms to enforce Washington’s DUI 
laws, including expanded DUI patrols, public awareness campaigns, and 
law enforcement training.88 However, there are no statutory “whistle-
blower” protections available for someone who reports impaired driving. 
Thus, if an employee is terminated for reporting impaired driving, that 
                                                            
 81. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.61.502 (2013), 46.61.504 (2013). 
 82. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502(5) (2013). Driving under the influence is a class C felony if 
(a) the person has four or more prior offenses within ten years; or (b) the person has previously been 
convicted of vehicular homicide while under the influence or vehicular assault while under the influ-
ence. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502(6) (2013). 
 83. Penalties depend upon the blood alcohol level of the offender and whether this is his or her 
first violation of the statute. A first-time offender with alcohol concentration below 0.15 will be 
imprisoned for between 1 to 364 days and fined between $350 and $5,000. WASH. REV. CODE § 
46.61.5055(1)(a) (2012). A first-time offender with alcohol concentration equal to or above 0.15 will 
be imprisoned for between 2 to 364 days and fined between $500 and $5,000. WASH. REV. CODE § 
46.61.5055(1)(b) (2012). Prior offenders will have both increased minimum jail sentences as well as 
increased minimum fines. See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.5055(2)–(3) (2012). 
 84. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.5055(5) (2012). 
 85. Programs and Priorities: Impaired Driving, WASH. TRAFFIC SAFETY COMMISSION 
http://www.wtsc.wa.gov/programs-priorities/impaired-driving/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2013). The 
WTSC defines “impaired driving” as driving while under the influence of drugs, while impaired by 
alcohol, or with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or above. Id. 
 86. WASH. TRAFFIC SAFETY COMM’N, Fatal Crashes Involving Impairment in Washington, 
2004 – 2008 (2009), available at http://www.wtsc.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads 
/2010/02/dui092.pdf. 
 87. Fatality Analysis Reporting System, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. 
http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/States/StatesAlcohol.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2013). 
 88. Programs and Priorities: Impaired Driving, supra note 85. 
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employee has no statutory remedy available under the DUI laws to pro-
test his termination. 
V. APPLICATION OF THE COMMON LAW TORT IN CUDNEY V. ALSCO, INC. 
This Part discusses the facts of the Cudney case and the reasoning 
of both the majority and dissent in analyzing the plaintiff’s wrongful dis-
charge claim. 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Matthew Cudney was hired by ALSCO in April of 2004 as service 
manager of its Spokane branch.89 During his employment with ALSCO, 
Cudney complained numerous times to his supervisor about the alcohol 
use of John Bartich, the general manager of the Spokane branch.90 On 
June 10, 2008, Cudney reported to his supervisor and the human re-
sources manager that he believed Bartich to be intoxicated at work: 
Cudney stated that Bartich was weaving back and forth, had slurred 
speech and glazed eyes, and smelled of alcohol.91 Cudney then observed 
Bartich drive off in a company vehicle.92 On August 5, 2008, Cudney 
was terminated from his job.93 
Cudney filed an action in Spokane Superior Court claiming that he 
was terminated in retaliation for reporting Bartich’s drinking and driving 
and that his discharge was a clear contravention of public policy.94 
Cudney pointed to WISHA and Washington’s DUI laws as two sources 
showing the public policy in Washington to be protected.95 ALSCO re-
moved to federal court and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Washington certified two questions to the Washington State Supreme 
Court.96 The Eastern District asked the Washington Supreme Court to 
determine whether WISHA and Washington’s DUI laws adequately 
promote Washington’s public policies so as to preclude a separate claim 
for wrongful discharge.97 
                                                            
 89. Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244, 245 (Wash. 2011). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 245–246. 
 95. Id. at 246. 
 96. Id. at 245. 
 97. Id. 
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The only issue presented for the court’s consideration was the 
“jeopardy” element.98 The court had to determine “whether current laws 
and regulations provide an adequate means of promoting the public poli-
cies of ensuring workplace safety, protecting against retaliation for re-
porting safety violations, and protecting the public from the dangers of 
drinking and driving.”99 
In addition to the briefs submitted by the parties to the case, the 
Department of Labor and Industries, the Washington Employment Law-
yers Association (WELA), and the Washington State Association for 
Justice Foundation (WSAJ Foundation) each filed amicus curiae 
briefs.100 All three amici argued that the court should hold that a common 
law cause of action for wrongful discharge was available under the 
WISHA statute.101 While the Department’s brief discussed only the first 
question (regarding WISHA), the WSAJ Foundation urged the court to 
answer no to both certified questions.102 
The Department of Labor and Industries’ brief argued that the rem-
edies provided by WISHA are inadequate to protect public policy.103 As 
the agency responsible for administering and enforcing WISHA, the De-
partment is very familiar with the rights and remedies available under the 
statute. When discussing the regulatory scheme, the Department asserted 
that there is no citation or penalty assessed by the Department if it de-
termines that a violation has occurred.104 Instead, the Department refers 
the matter to the Attorney General’s Office to file an action in court.105 
The Department argued that the court had recognized a tort for wrongful 
discharge in Wilmot and that the court should not revisit the issue without 
                                                            
 98. Id. at 246. The clarity element was undisputed because the parties stipulated that WISHA 
establishes a clear public policy of ensuring the safety of workers and protecting those who report 
workplace safety violations and that the DUI laws establish the clear public policy of protecting the 
public from drunk drivers. Id. at 247 n.1. The court was not asked to decide the causation and ab-
sence of justification elements as those are fact-specific inquiries. Id. 
 99. Id. at 247. 
 100. Brief for Department of Labor & Industries as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2011) (No. 83124–6) [hereinafter L&I Brief]; Brief 
for Washington Employment Lawyers Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Cudney v. 
ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2011) (No. 83124–6) [hereinafter WELA Brief]; Brief for Wash-
ington State Ass’n for Justice Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Cudney v. 
ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2011) (No. 83124–6) [hereinafter WSAJF Brief]. 
 101. L&I Brief, supra note 100, at *8–10; WELA Brief, supra note 100, at *3–4; WSAJF 
Brief, supra note 100, at *5–6. 
 102. WSAJF Brief, supra note 100, at *17, *25. 
 103. L&I Brief, supra note 100, at *8. 
 104. Id. at *3. 
 105. Id. 
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a change in the statute.106 The Department also argued that the WISHA 
remedy was inadequate under either a Wilmot or Korslund analysis.107 
The WSAJ Foundation argued that the court should allow a claim 
to move forward under both WISHA and the DUI laws. They argued that 
when the employee’s conduct directly relates to the public policy in 
question, the employee should not be required to show that his conduct 
was necessary for the enforcement of the public policy.108 Following this 
line of reasoning, they argued that Cudney’s action in reporting his sus-
picions was directly related to the WISHA public policy, and therefore, 
the jeopardy element was satisfied.109 In the alternative, WSAJ also ar-
gued that if the plaintiff must show the inadequacy of other remedies, 
Cudney would still prevail because the remedies under WISHA are inad-
equate.110 Finally, the WSAJ argued that criminal prosecutions are not an 
adequate means of promoting the public policy embodied in the DUI 
laws and that therefore actions such as reporting suspected impaired 
drivers is necessary for the effective enforcement of DUI laws.111 
WELA also argued in favor of the plaintiff on both questions. Re-
garding the WISHA question, WELA argued that WISHA was not in-
tended as the exclusive means of protection and that the administrative 
scheme is not an adequate means of vindicating public policy.112 WELA 
obtained data from the Department of Labor and Industries showing that 
13.8% of cases received by the Department are rejected as untimely and 
argued that the thirty-day filing period did not provide an adequate alter-
native means.113 Finally, WELA reasoned that criminal statutes are sel-
dom an adequate means for protecting public policy due to the lack of 
remedies for the employee who exposes a violation.114 
Ultimately, a narrow majority of the Washington Supreme Court 
answered that both WISHA and Washington’s DUI laws adequately 
promote public policy, and therefore, a separate claim of action is pre-
cluded.115 
                                                            
 106. Id. at *5. 
 107. Id. at *8, *10. 
 108. WSAJF Brief, supra note 100, at *8. 
 109. Id. at *17–18. 
 110. Id. at *19–20. 
 111. Id. at *20–21. 
 112. WELA Brief, supra note 100, at *14–20. 
 113. Id. at *19–20. 
 114. Id. at *10. 
 115. Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244, 250 (Wash. 2011). 
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B. The Washington Supreme Court’s Holding 
In Cudney, the majority held that WISHA and its accompanying 
regulations adequately protected the identified public policy. The court 
set out three reasons for its determination that “WISHA’s retaliation stat-
ute provides extensive protections to employees who claim that they suf-
fered retaliation for filing complaints related to workplace safety.”116 
First, the statute prohibits employers from discharging employees for 
exercising any WISHA rights.117 Second, the statute provides a com-
plaint filing and investigation procedure, which results in the director 
filing an action on the employee’s behalf if he or she determines a viola-
tion has occurred.118 Even if the director does not determine a violation 
has occurred, the employee may still bring a suit on his own behalf.119 
Regardless of who files the suit, the superior court is authorized to order 
all appropriate relief.120 Finally, the court noted that the superior court is 
not limited to the relief specifically mentioned in the statute.121 
The court found Korslund to be controlling in its determination of 
the adequacy of WISHA’s remedies in promoting the public policy. In 
Korslund, the court held that the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 
(ERA) provided comprehensive remedies that adequately promoted the 
public policy, precluding the plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim.122 In 
comparing the ERA to WISHA, the Cudney court noted that both statutes 
provide for agency investigations and determinations, and both allow the 
plaintiff to bring their own claim if the agency does not take action.123 
The ERA sets out what remedies the secretary should take if it deter-
mines that a violation has occurred; in contrast, WISHA does not set out 
specific remedies, but does grant the superior court power to order all 
appropriate relief.124 The court stated that by not determining specific 
remedies, “WISHA is actually more comprehensive than the ERA and is 
more than adequate.”125 The court found Cudney’s argument that the 
                                                            
 116. Id. at 247. 
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thirty-day filing deadline contained in WISHA makes the statute inade-
quate to protect public policy meritless.126 
Although not overruling any prior cases, the court did distinguish 
Cudney from both Wilmot and Ellis and disapproved any implication in 
either case that WISHA does not adequately promote public policy.127 
The court noted that Wilmot was not controlling here, even though a stat-
ute similar to WISHA was considered, because the focus in Wilmot was 
on whether the statute was the mandatory and exclusive remedy, not 
whether the statute was adequate to promote the public policy.128 Moreo-
ver, the court noted that Wilmot preceded the articulation of the four-part 
test in Gardner by five years and that in cases since Gardner, the court 
had said “the plaintiff must show that other means of promoting the pub-
lic policy are inadequate.”129 The court therefore determined that Wilmot 
was not on point in determining the outcome in this case.130 The court 
found that Ellis was not determinative because the court in Ellis did not 
address whether WISHA adequately promoted public policy in answer-
ing the questions presented by the parties in that case.131 
Based upon the Korslund analysis, and distinguishing Wilmot and 
Ellis, the court held that WISHA’s statutory remedies are adequate in 
promoting public policy; thus, the plaintiff was unable to satisfy the 
jeopardy element required for a claim of wrongful discharge in violation 
of public policy.132 
The court also held that Cudney was unable to show that current 
DUI laws were inadequate to protect public policy. In order to prevail, 
the court stated that Cudney had to show that reporting suspected drunk 
driving to his manager was the “only available adequate means” to pro-
mote the public policy.133 In light of the criminal laws, enforcement 
mechanism, and penalties, the court held that Cudney’s conduct was a 
“roundabout remedy that is highly unlikely to protect the public from the 
immediate problem of a drunk driver on its roads.”134 The court finally 
                                                            
 126. Id. at 248–49. The court reasoned that an employee has immediate notice of a discharge 
and would know that he had recently raised a safety concern, so requiring the employee to file a 
complaint within thirty days of the discharge does not make the statutory remedy inadequate. Id. The 
court also pointed out the potential to toll the thirty-day period under certain circumstances as anoth-
er factor in its determination. Id. 
 127. Id. at 249–50. 
 128. Id. at 249. 
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 134. Id. 
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stated that the “other means of promoting the public policy need not be 
available to a particular individual so long as the other means are ade-
quate to safeguard the public policy.”135 The court therefore held that 
“Cudney has not shown that the current DUI laws are an inadequate 
means of promoting the public policy, so his claim fails.”136 
C. The Dissent’s Reasoning 
Justice Stephens, joined by Justice Charles Johnson, Justice Cham-
bers and Justice Pro Tem Sanders, dissented. The dissent would have 
answered no to both certified questions and allowed Cudney’s claim to 
move forward under both WISHA and the DUI laws.137 In analyzing 
WISHA, Justice Stephens argued that the court should not change its 
interpretation of a statute that has remained unchanged since its enact-
ment in 1973.138 The dissent argued that Wilmot was instructive in decid-
ing this case and questioned both of the majority’s assertions that Wilmot 
and Korslund contemplated different issues and that Wilmot was outdat-
ed.139 Although Wilmot was decided before the court established the 
Gardner four-part test, the Gardner court stated that the “adoption of this 
test does not change the existing common law in this state.”140 Moreover, 
the dissent noted that had the court felt the reasoning in Wilmot was un-
sound, it could have rejected the Wilmot analysis in deciding Ellis, which 
was decided several years after the Gardner decision.141 The Ellis court, 
however, solidified the Wilmot reasoning by citing Wilson with approval, 
which recognized WISHA as the basis for a public policy tort claim.142 
The dissent noted in dicta that, even if the question had not been 
decided in Wilmot, the court should still allow a claim to move forward 
because the remedies under WISHA are inadequate to promote the public 
                                                            
 135. Id. (quoting Hubbard v. Spokane County, 50 P.3d 602, 611 (Wash. 2002)). 
 136. Id. at 250–51. 
 137. Id. at 256 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 255. 
 139. Id. at 253. 
 140. Id. at 251 (quoting Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 382 (Wash. 1996)). 
 141. Id. at 253–54. The dissent points out that the Ellis court “expressly addressed the jeopardy 
prong and held that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding as a matter of law that Ellis’s conduct 
was not necessary to enforce the public policy at issue.” Id. at 254. Furthermore, the dissent notes 
that the Ellis analysis “echoed Professor Perritt’s view that ‘public policy tort cases involving em-
ployee reports of employer misconduct to outside agencies present relatively strong arguments on 
the jeopardy element, because of the likelihood that agencies charged with public policy enforce-
ment depend on such reports.’” Id. (quoting PERRITT, supra note 17, § 3.34). Finally, the dissent 
argued that the Ellis decision solidified the existence of a public policy claim under WISHA, regard-
less of statutory remedies, by citing Wilson with approval. Id. 
 142. Id. at 254. 
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policy at issue.143 The dissent’s arguments are supported by several limi-
tations on the WISHA remedies. First, assuming a claim has merit, the 
Department will bring the action in court, but the Department does not 
represent the employee.144 Second, while the statute authorizes the court 
to grant all appropriate relief, the Department “does not plead compensa-
tory damages, including emotional distress damages, or front pay.”145 
Finally, the dissent identified the thirty-day filing period as “the most 
striking feature of the WISHA administrative scheme that renders the 
statutory remedy inadequate.”146 
While the majority characterized the thirty-day filing period as 
enough time for an employee to bring a claim, the dissent pointed to oth-
er court decisions holding that shortened filing periods are substantively 
unconscionable.147 The dissent argued that an employee may not know 
the true reason for the termination right away, especially if the employee 
is not given any reason at all.148 While WISHA regulations allow for toll-
ing of the thirty-day period if the employer concealed or misled the em-
ployee, it does not allow for tolling if the employer provides no reason 
for the termination.149 The dissent found it “unrealistic . . . to expect that 
within 30 days of getting a pink slip an employee will be able to find and 
hire a lawyer, investigate the real reason for his or her termination, and 
file suit.”150 
Although the majority relied on Korslund in analyzing the adequa-
cy of WISHA remedies, the dissent argued that the remedies provided by 
the ERA are quite different than WISHA and that the majority’s reliance 
on Korslund was misplaced.151 The ERA establishes an administrative 
process for adjudicating complaints and provides comprehensive reme-
dies including reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages, and at-
torney and expert witness fees.152 In contrast, WISHA does not contain 
any administrative process for reviewing and adjudicating complaints,153 
and does not provide the same remedies for the plaintiff. 
                                                            
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 254 (citing L&I Brief, supra note 100, at *10–12). 
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 148. Id. at 255. 
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 152. Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Services, Inc., 125 P.3d 119, 127 (Wash. 2005). 
 153. L&I Brief, supra note 100, at *19. 
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The dissent concluded that the remedies provided by WISHA are 
inadequate and that this should be considered evidence of the legisla-
ture’s intent for WISHA to supplement the existing private cause of ac-
tion.154 The dissent argued that the court should follow Wilmot and Ellis 
and allow the tort claim to move forward. 
The dissent also argued that Cudney’s claim under the DUI laws 
should be allowed to move forward and that the existence of a criminal 
enforcement mechanism does not necessarily preclude the claim.155 For 
the dissent, the key question in determining whether public policy would 
be jeopardized was if an employee could be fired for reporting viola-
tions.156 The dissent argued that “[r]elying solely upon the criminal law 
mechanism for enforcement of the DUI laws thus leaves the enforcement 
of the public policy uncertain” and that the certified question should be 
answered no, allowing Cudney’s claim to move forward.157 
D. The Motion for Reconsideration 
Following the court’s decision, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Re-
consideration on September 21, 2011.158 The motion was supported by 
Professor Henry Perritt, WELA, and the WSAJ Foundation.159 The de-
fendant filed an answer on January 12, 2012, and the court denied the 
motion on March 5, 2012. 
VI. FLAWS IN THE MAJORITY’S REASONING AND POTENTIAL FUTURE 
IMPACT OF THE COURT’S DECISION 
This Part contends that the majority opinion erred in determining 
that WISHA adequately protected the public policy of providing safe 
workplaces and protecting workers who report safety concerns and that 
the majority opinion incorrectly determined that Washington’s DUI laws 
precluded a cause of action for wrongful discharge. This Part also dis-
cusses the impact the Cudney decision will have on future wrongful dis-
                                                            
 154. Cudney, 259 P.3d at 255 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
 155. Id. at 256. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Motion for Reconsideration, Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2011) (No. 
83124–6). 
 159. Amicus Curiae Memorandum by Henry H. Perritt, Jr. and the Washington Employment 
Lawyers Ass’n, Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2011) (No. 83124–6) [hereinafter 
WELA ACM]; Washington State Ass’n for Justice Foundation Amicus Curiae Memorandum on 
Reconsideration, Cudney v. ALSCO, Inc., 259 P.3d 244 (Wash. 2011) (No. 83124–6) [hereinafter 
WSAJF ACM]. Professor Perritt, who articulated the four-part test adopted by the court in Gardner, 
is an expert on this topic and often quoted by the court. He co-authored the WELA ACM. 
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charge cases under WISHA and other statutes. Finally, this Part argues 
that the Washington legislature should consider enacting remedial legis-
lation and that the Washington Supreme Court should consider redefin-
ing the narrow boundaries of the common law exception in a future case. 
A. The Majority Erred in Holding that WISHA Adequately Protects 
Public Policy 
The majority’s holding that WISHA adequately protected public 
policy is incorrect for three reasons. First, the thirty-day filing period 
provided by WISHA is inadequate and does not account for the realities 
that a terminated employee faces following a discharge. Second, the ad-
ministrative remedies provided by WISHA are not sufficiently robust 
and are not comparable to the statutory scheme the court found to be ad-
equate in Korslund. Third, even if an employee does file a claim within 
the thirty-day period and the Department does file a suit on the employ-
ee’s behalf, the potential remedies for that cause of action are not equal 
to what an employee could recover under a public policy tort claim. 
1. The Thirty-Day Filing Period: An Unreasonable Remedy 
As opposed to a public policy tort claim, which has a three-year 
statute of limitations, an employee who is terminated in violation of 
WISHA is allowed only thirty days to file a claim with the Department 
of Labor and Industries. Although the majority found thirty days to be 
plenty of time for a terminated worker to file a complaint, the opinion 
overlooked the practical realities that a terminated employee is faced 
with following a job loss. The immediate concerns for most terminated 
workers will revolve around finding a new job, applying for unemploy-
ment, arranging for health insurance, managing finances, and dealing 
with the emotional strain that accompanies a termination. These activities 
may extend well beyond the first thirty days of termination. Even an em-
ployee who immediately decides to pursue legal action will find it diffi-
cult, within thirty days, to “find and hire a lawyer, investigate the real 
reason for his or her termination, and file suit.”160 
In addition to these practical issues, a thirty-day filing period 
should be considered legally inadequate as well. As noted by the dissent 
in Cudney, the Washington Supreme Court held a claim-filing period of 
180 days to be substantively unconscionable in the context of employer–
employee arbitration contracts.161 In that context, the court held that by 
                                                            
 160. Cudney, 259 P.3d at 255 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. at 254. 
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limiting the period in which an employee can bring a claim, the employer 
gains an unfair advantage and the employee may be forced to forgo the 
opportunity to file a claim.162 While the arbitration contract context in-
volves a contract between the employer and employee, it seems ridicu-
lous to suggest that it is unconscionable to limit an employee to a 180-
day filing period, but that a thirty-day limitation for claims under 
WISHA is adequate. 
Finally, the fact that the thirty-day filing period is unreasonable can 
be inferred from the number of potential claims that are rejected by the 
Department of Labor and Industries because of the thirty-day filing peri-
od. Between 2004 and 2009, the Department rejected 112 out of 807 
claims because they were untimely.163 This figure does not account for 
any additional cases that “were never filed with L&I because the com-
plainant learned of the 30 day limit after the time had expired.”164 
2. WISHA Does Not Provide a Robust Statutory Scheme Like the ERA 
The majority also erred in determining that WISHA provided ro-
bust statutory remedies that were as comprehensive as the remedies pro-
vided under the ERA.165 The administrative schemes created by the two 
statutes are remarkably different, and the majority ignored key compo-
nents of the ERA that enhance that statute’s ability to serve as a compre-
hensive remedy. Both statutes prohibit discrimination against an employ-
ee who reports violations and allow the employee to file a complaint if 
he believes he has been subject to discrimination.166 But one of the most 
striking differences is that under WISHA, if the director determines a 
violation has occurred, he must bring a cause of action against the em-
ployer in court.167 In contrast, if the Secretary of Labor (the Secretary) 
determines a violation of the ERA has occurred, the Secretary has the 
power to order the employer to reinstate the employee, provide compen-
satory damages, and assess attorney’s fees against the employer.168 Thus 
                                                            
 162. Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 787 (Wash. 2004). 
 163. WELA Brief, supra note 100, at *16. 
 164. Id. at *19. 
 165. The majority actually stated that WISHA remedies were more comprehensive than the 
remedies under the ERA because WISHA does not set out specific remedies available. Cudney, 259 
P.3d at 248. 
 166. 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160 (2010). 
 167. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.17.160(2) (2010). However, in practice L&I will refer the matter 
to the Attorney General’s Office. L&I Brief, supra note 100, at *3. 
 168. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(B) (2010). The statute provides that reinstatement requires com-
pensation (including back pay), terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment. Id. 
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under WISHA, all that is granted is a cause of action, whereas under 
ERA, the Secretary can directly authorize a remedy. 
The ERA and WISHA also differ in the filing period allowed by the 
statute. Under the ERA, an employee has 180 days following a discharge 
to file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.169 The Secretary has thir-
ty days to complete an investigation into the complaint and must either 
issue an order providing relief or dismiss the complaint within ninety 
days of receipt.170 If the Secretary has not issued a final order within one 
year after the filing of the complaint, the employee may bring an action 
in district court for de novo review.171 As discussed above, WISHA only 
allows an employee thirty days to file a complaint with the Department 
of Labor and Industries.172 Thus, the WISHA filing period is significantly 
shorter than the period available under the ERA. 
3. The Department of Labor and Industries Does Not Claim All Poten-
tial Remedies 
The majority’s determination that WISHA is an adequate remedy is 
also erroneous because the administrative agency tasked with enforcing 
WISHA does not provide an employee filer with the full complement of 
remedies available under the common law tort claim. In a suit instituted 
by the Department of Labor and Industries, the Department only seeks 
the remedies explicitly provided for in the statute, such as back wages 
and reinstatement.173 The Department does not plead other damages that 
an employee may recover in a tort claim, such as compensatory damages 
or front pay.174 The majority relied on the fact that the statute authorizes 
the court to grant “all appropriate relief” in concluding that the remedies 
are adequate.175 But if the agency bringing the claim does not plead those 
types of remedies,176 and is not truly representing the plaintiff,177 then the 
court cannot reasonably expect that a full array of remedies will be pro-
vided to a wrongfully discharged employee. Maintaining all potential 
remedies would effectuate public policy by encouraging and protecting 
employees who report wrongful conduct. If the employee does not have 
                                                            
 169. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(1) (2010). 
 170. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(2)(A) (2010). 
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access to all remedies available to him, he is being penalized for engag-
ing in conduct that public policy and statute asks him to do. 
B. DUI Laws Are Inadequate to Protect Public Policy and Contain No 
Remedy for Employees 
As discussed in Part IV of this Note, impaired driving is a serious 
problem in Washington State, and impaired drivers were involved in the 
majority of fatal car accidents.178 Even though drivers caught while under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs face serious criminal penalties, the 
criminal statutes have not fully eliminated the problem.179 Because cur-
rent statutes and enforcement mechanisms have not solved the problem 
of impaired driving, the majority erroneously concluded that Washing-
ton’s DUI laws are adequate to protect public policy. 
In addition to the general inadequacy of the criminal statutes, the 
court also erred in determining that Cudney’s claim was barred regard-
less of the lack of a remedy for the employee. The majority concluded 
that it is “the public policy that must be promoted, not Cudney’s individ-
ual interests. ‘The other means of promoting the public policy need not 
be available to a particular individual so long as the other means are ade-
quate to safeguard the public policy.’”180 
However, this conclusion undermines the purpose of the public pol-
icy exception. The Washington State Supreme Court adopted the public 
policy exception because it properly balanced the interests of employees 
and employers.181 In his treatise, Professor Perritt argued that the excep-
tion required courts to balance employee, employer, and societal inter-
ests.182 The majority opinion in Cudney erred in ignoring the balancing of 
these interests. 
The four-part test ensures this balancing by only allowing an em-
ployee to prevail when he meets all four elements (clarity, jeopardy, cau-
sation, and absence of justification).183 The interests of society in protect-
ing public policy are represented because an employee must show a clear 
mandate of public policy and that his conduct directly relates or was nec-
essary to protect that public policy. The interest of employers in freely 
running their businesses is represented by requiring that the discharge be 
                                                            
 178. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra notes 81–88 and accompanying text. 
 180. Cudney, 259 P.3d at 249 (quoting Hubbard v. Spokane Cnty., 50 P.3d 602, 611 (Wash. 
2002)). 
 181. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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caused by the conduct and by requiring that the employer not have a le-
gitimate justification. In Cudney, the majority focused so narrowly on the 
certified question of the adequacy of the two Washington statutes that it 
failed to consider the interests of the employer or employee. Further-
more, the court did not consider the interests of society beyond the rote 
enforcement of the statutes. This failure led to the erroneous conclusion 
that Cudney’s claims were barred due to alternative means of protecting 
public policy. 
C. Impact on Future Wrongful Discharge Claims 
One of the immediate consequences of the court’s decision in 
Cudney is that it precludes any future plaintiffs from raising a claim of 
wrongful discharge when the public policy violated arises from WISHA. 
In many cases, a terminated employee will not file a complaint with the 
Department of Labor and Industries within the thirty-day filing require-
ment.184 For those employees, a wrongful discharge claim will necessari-
ly fail unless the plaintiff can provide an alternative public policy con-
sideration that is not supported by statutory remedies like those contained 
in WISHA. The practical effect of this decision will be to keep plaintiffs 
with meritorious cases out of court and to potentially silence future whis-
tleblowers that would have otherwise reported wrongful conduct. 
Another potential impact on the common law tort may arise if the 
court utilizes the Korslund and Cudney analysis when determining 
whether statutes with similar remedial language sufficiently protect pub-
lic policy. As discussed above, the workers compensation statute at issue 
in Wilmot contains an anti-discrimination statute that mirrors WISHA.185 
Based on the majority’s analysis in Cudney, it is quite possible that a re-
viewing court will determine that the workers compensation statute ade-
quately protects public policy so as to preclude a common law tort claim 
by a discharged employee. This is especially true in light of the fact that 
the workers compensation statute has an even longer filing period—
ninety days instead of the thirty-day period provided by WISHA.186 The 
workers compensation statute is the only statute that shares the same re-
medial language as WISHA. 
The future impact of the court’s analysis regarding the DUI laws 
creates perhaps even greater concerns. The court’s opinion in Cudney 
“appears to rule that criminal statutes are an adequate alternative means 
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of vindicating public policy even where the reporting employee can be 
retaliated against by the employer with impunity. . . . Washington State 
will be the only state . . . which applies the common law claim in that 
way.” 187 By determining that a cause of action was precluded because 
the DUI laws adequately protected public policy, the court has potential-
ly foreclosed a claim for any employee who reports illegal conduct to his 
employer and is subsequently discharged. All criminal activity has a 
statute that will proscribe the conduct and provide penalties for offend-
ers. Crimes also have an enforcement mechanism, such as the police and 
the justice system. Under the Cudney analysis, an employer who dis-
charges an employee for reporting illegal conduct can point to the crimi-
nal statute and to the police force, and argue that the employer is free 
from liability. This cannot be the outcome the court intended. Without a 
private cause of action, there is no remedy for a wrongfully discharged 
employee, and therefore, there is a disincentive for an employee to report 
illegal conduct.188 
D. Two Suggestions for Reopening the Door 
1. The Washington Legislature Should Adopt Remedial Legislation to 
Provide for a Private Cause of Action Outside of the Filing Period 
With the Cudney decision, the court has foreclosed any wrongful 
discharge claims premised off workplace safety violations under WISHA 
or reporting criminal activity under Washington’s DUI laws. The court’s 
analysis has also potentially precluded claims under other workplace or 
criminal statutes. This decision has removed an important tool in ensur-
ing that public policy is protected. To ensure that employers are not al-
lowed to terminate employees in violation of public policy, the Washing-
ton State Legislature should adopt remedial legislation that creates a civil 
cause of action for a termination in violation of a clear mandate of public 
policy. 
a. Proposed Senate Bill 6072 
In the 2012 regular session, the Washington State Senate heard 
proposed Senate Bill 6072 (SB 6072).189 SB 6072 would prohibit em-
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2052 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:2025 
ployers from taking “materially adverse action against an employee or 
independent contractor where retaliation is a substantial factor in the em-
ployer’s decision to take action.”190 If enacted, the new statute would 
provide a civil cause of action for any employee or independent contrac-
tor who has been retaliated against for conduct “that the employee or 
independent contract reasonably believes promotes a clear mandate of 
any public policy.”191 The new cause of action is independent of a com-
mon law action and is available regardless of the “existence of any other 
. . . statutory or administrative means of protecting public policy,” and 
provides for a three year statute of limitations.192 An employee bringing a 
cause of action can “recover actual damages . . . together with . . . rea-
sonable attorneys’ fees and any other appropriate remedy authorized by 
the Washington law against discrimination.”193 While the proposed legis-
lation would certainly ameliorate any effects of the court’s decision in 
Cudney, the scope of the bill creates broader employee protections than 
those provided under the common law tort. 
SB 6072 is not simply a codification of the pre-Cudney common 
law tort of wrongful discharge. Some elements are familiar, such as the 
requirement of a “clear mandate of any public policy.”194 Yet SB 6072 
extends protections farther than the common law tort, covering both em-
ployees and independent contractors for a cause of action after any mate-
rially adverse action by the employer,195 not just a discharge. Employee 
advocates would argue that this broadening is appropriate to ensure that 
public policy and employee interests are protected. But the expansion 
neglects to account for the interests of the employer, or the societal inter-
ests in allowing the free movement of labor and the unfettered manage-
ment of a business. The court has recognized the need to balance inter-
ests of the employer, employee, and society, and the Washington State 
Legislature should do the same in considering remedial legislation. 
b. Proposal for Narrower Legislation 
To ensure the interests of all parties are properly balanced, the leg-
islature should enact narrow remedial legislation that would create a civil 
                                                                                                                                     
ciary. Committee Meeting Documents, WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE http://apps.leg.wa.gov/ 
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cause of action for any employee who has been constructively or actually 
discharged in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. The new 
cause of action should adopt many of the constraints of the common law 
tort of wrongful discharge. The burden of proof would be on the employ-
ee to prove that a clear public policy exists, that the employee’s conduct 
was either directly related to the public policy or was necessary for effec-
tive enforcement of the public policy, and that there is a causal relation-
ship between the employee’s conduct and the termination. Several as-
pects of SB 6072 could also be incorporated into a narrow remedial stat-
ute. The cause of action should be available regardless of other statutory 
or administrative remedies available to the employee and a three-year 
statute of limitations should apply. In addition, the employee should be 
able to recover actual damages, attorney’s fees, and any other appropriate 
remedy the court shall deem necessary, such as reinstatement or injunc-
tions against future action. 
This narrow remedial legislative scheme will encompass many of 
the important employee protections that were once available to Washing-
ton employees under a cause of action for wrongful discharge in viola-
tion of public policy. By the enactment of this statute, an employer will 
not be allowed to discharge an employee with impunity when that dis-
charge violates a clear mandate of public policy. Thus society’s compet-
ing interests in the promotion of public policy and the free flow of labor 
are balanced with the employer’s desire to run its business free of unnec-
essary judicial interference and with the employee’s interest in employ-
ment. 
While this legislation is narrow in the sense that it limits recovery 
to only an actual or constructive discharge, it is nevertheless broader than 
protections offered in some other states. For instance, some states prohib-
it an employer from discharging or retaliating only against an employee 
who reports a violation of law.196 New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee 
Protection Act (CEPA) falls on the other side of the spectrum and pro-
vides a very large amount of protection for employees. CEPA prohibits 
any retaliatory action against an employee who reports or refuses to par-
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ticipate in activity that is a violation of law, fraudulent or criminal activi-
ty, or is “incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning 
the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.”197 
The Washington legislature should narrowly tailor remedial legisla-
tion to maintain the balance of power between employers and employees 
in Washington State. A broad worker protection statute is unnecessary. 
In order to ensure that employers are free to run their businesses as they 
see fit, but that employees are protected from discharge in contravention 
of a clear mandate of public policy, the legislature should enact narrow 
remedial legislation creating a private cause of action. 
2. Washington Supreme Court Should Reverse the Cudney Decision in 
a Future Wrongful Discharge Case 
For the reasons discussed above, the Washington Supreme Court 
erred in holding that WISHA and Washington’s DUI laws adequately 
promote public policy so as to foreclose a common law cause of action. 
The Cudney decision created uncertainty regarding the new scope of the 
common law public policy exception. The court did not eliminate the 
exception as a cause of action and continued to utilize the four-part 
Perritt framework in its analysis. However, by determining that both the 
WISHA administrative scheme and the DUI enforcement mechanisms 
adequately protected their respective public policies, it is still unclear 
when the court will apply the exception. While unlikely, the ideal out-
come would be for the court to reverse Cudney upon its next considera-
tion of the public policy exception.198 Barring a reversal, the court should 
provide clear guidance for when a cause of action exists under the nar-
row confines of the Cudney decision. 
3. Counterarguments and a Response 
Supporters of the Cudney decision may argue that the court was 
correct in its holding because the public policy exception is narrow, and 
the court was right to limit its reach. Supporters would likely make two 
main arguments. First, remedial legislation is unnecessary because em-
ployees are already protected by both statutory remedies and common 
law exceptions. Second, the court should let the Cudney decision stand 
because it properly narrowed the public policy exception to only those 
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situations where other adequate means of protecting the public policy do 
not exist. Each of these arguments is addressed below. 
a. Necessity of Remedial Legislation 
Many employers and proponents of the Cudney decision may argue 
that there is no need for the Washington State Legislature to entertain the 
proposal for remedial legislation. They would argue that employees are 
already protected in many ways by statute, such as the anti-
discrimination statute in WISHA. The argument maintains that Cudney 
could have filed a timely complaint with the Department of Labor and 
Industries, had his complaint investigated, and then filed suit if the De-
partment chose not to pursue action. Proponents would argue that provid-
ing Cudney with another avenue for remedy is unnecessary when a statu-
tory remedy already exists. 
What this argument fails to account for is that when a statutory 
remedy or administrative scheme does not fully protect the employee, as 
it did not here, the public policy is threatened regardless of what statuto-
ry remedies the employee may have available. In this situation, the inter-
ests of society in protecting public policy will weigh heavily in favor of 
the employee. With narrowly tailored remedial legislation, an employee 
will be protected from an employer improperly using its power to thwart 
public policy, and the interests of the employee and society will be pro-
tected. 
b. Narrowness of the Exception 
A second argument that proponents may raise is that the public pol-
icy tort is a very narrow exception to the doctrine of employment at-will. 
They would argue that the court’s decision in Cudney was correct be-
cause it properly narrowed the scope of the exception to only those cases 
where other adequate means of protecting public policy are not available. 
The public policy tort requires the court to balance the interests of em-
ployees, employers, and society.199 Proponents of the Cudney decision 
may argue that the interest of society in freedom of contract will only be 
outweighed by the interest to protect public policy when that policy is 
threatened. Thus, where other adequate means to protect the public poli-
cy exist, there is no need for societal concern. 
But public policy may still be threatened, even if other means are 
available for protection. If an employee can make a complaint within 
thirty days, and the court finds that to be an adequate remedy, society 
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may still have an interest in the public policy of protecting whistleblow-
ers. If an employer is allowed to terminate a whistleblower, escaping lia-
bility only because the employee did not file a complaint within thirty 
days, then it is highly probable that this type of employee conduct will be 
discouraged. If employees are not protected in reporting inappropriate 
activity, then those reports are likely to stop. Regardless of what other 
means may exist to protect public policy, deterring an employee from 
reporting such activity is contrary to public policy, and thus societal in-
terests will weigh in favor of protecting the employee’s interests. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Since Washington’s 1984 adoption of the common law tort of 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, courts have determined 
that it is a narrow exception to the doctrine of employment at-will. In 
Cudney, the court narrowed the exception too far. By foreclosing a 
wrongful discharge claim in workplace safety cases, the court has con-
strained the potential remedies available to an employee to the narrow 
remedies provided by the WISHA anti-discrimination statute. The re-
quirement that an employee file a complaint within thirty days of termi-
nation, the absence of a robust administrative scheme, and the lack of full 
remedies available renders these statutory remedies inadequate to protect 
public policy. Furthermore, the court’s determination that a criminal 
statute also forecloses a common law claim, despite a complete lack of 
remedy for an employee, creates a strong disincentive for an employee to 
report illegal conduct and undermines the foundation of the public policy 
exception. 
The narrow public policy exception to at-will employment is in-
tended to prevent employers from discharging an employee in contraven-
tion of a clear public policy. The court’s decision in Cudney provided the 
employer with impunity to do just that. In order to rectify this deviation 
from past precedent and from the purpose of the tort, the Washington 
legislature should enact narrow remedial legislation providing an em-
ployee with a private cause of action. Furthermore, the Washington Su-
preme Court should consider reframing the limits of the public policy 
exception in a future case. Without action from either the legislature or 
the court, or both, many wrongfully discharged employees will find that 
the door to the public policy exception has been firmly closed by the 
court. 
 
